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Abstract 
The perpetual crisis of Late Capitalism, ubiquitously present in our quotidian as 
background to all being-doing, is confronted by the non-method of the mise-en-crise of 
our devising. By putting our quotidian in crisis, we educe crisis from the future and 
invoke the infinite potential of the anarchive—a drawing forth which produces chaos 
within process so that difference inhabits repetition. We rely on the active forgetting of 
inherited disciplined knowledges and perfected operating procedures to actualise modes 
and practices of composition which enable experimentation through a multiplicity of 
contemplations and aberrant becomings. We espouse an affirmative, immanent critique 
as a mode of knowing and composing so that when we ask ―What next?‖ we leave no 
other course of action other than the ineluctable exercise of our subjectivity as the 
facticity of resolution of crisis. 
Keywords: Crisis; Anarchive; Critique; Quotidian; Non-deferral. 
 
Resumo 
A crise perpétua do capitalismo tardio, presente de forma ubíqua em nosso cotidiano 
como pano de fundo de todo ser-fazendo, é confrontada com o não-método da mise-en-
crise de nossa concepção. Colocando nosso cotidiano em crise, geramos crise do futuro 
e invocamos o potencial infinito do anarquivo - um desdobramento que produz o caos 
dentro do processo para que a diferença habite a repetição. Contamos com o 
esquecimento ativo de conhecimentos disciplinados herdados e procedimentos 
operacionais aperfeiçoados para atualizar modos e práticas de composição que 
permitem a experimentação através de uma multiplicidade de contemplações e de 
devires aberrantes. Adotamos uma crítica afirmativa e imanente como um modo de 
conhecer e compor, de modo que quando perguntamos "O que vem depois?", não 
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deixamos outro curso de ação além do exercício inelutável de nossa subjetividade como 
facticidade de resolução de crises. 
Palavras-chave: Crise; Anarquivo; Crítica; Cotidiano; Improrrogável. 
 
Resumen 
Confrontamos la crisis perpétua del capitalismo tardio, presente de forma ubíqua en 
nuestro cotidiano como tela de fondo de todo ser-hacer, con el no-método de la ―puesta 
en crisis‖ de nuestra concepción. Abrazando el potencial infinito del anarquivo 
invocamos en el presente una crisis futura para que surja el caos dentro del  proceso. 
Contamos con el olvido activo de conocimientos disciplinares y praticas perfeccionadas 
a fin de elaborar modos y prácticas de composición que posibiliten una multiplicidad de 
contemplaciones y devenires aberrantes. Como estrategia para lidiar con una crisis, 
proponemos una crítica inmanente, afirmativa, como modo de construcción de saberes 
que se basan sobre la filosofía de la diferencia y su articulación, de forma que cuando 
preguntemos ¿Que sigue ahora? no dejamos ningún otro curso que el ejercicio de 
nuestra subjetividad como hecho factible de la diferencia. 
Palabras Clave: Crisis; Anarquivo; Crítica; Cotidiano; Improrrogable. 
 
 
Deleuze opens Cinema 2: The 
Time Image by relating a scene from 
Giorgio De Sica‘s 1948 landmark film 
Umberto D. We see a ―young maid 
going into the kitchen in the morning, 
making a series of mechanical, weary 
gestures, cleaning a bit, driving the ants 
away from a water fountain, picking up 
the coffee grinder, stretching out her 
foot to close the door with her toe. And 
her eyes meet her pregnant woman's 
belly, and it is as though all the misery 
in the world were going to be born‖ 
(Deleuze, 1985/1989, p.1). Deleuze 
identifies the scene as illustrative of the 
transition from one regime of images to 
another: it depicts ―a necessary passage 
from the crisis of image-action to the 
pure optical-sound image‖ (Deleuze, 
1985/1989, p.3)—it is the threshold that 
heralds the transformation of the 
movement-image into a time-image. 
And what makes this a time-image and 
not an action-image of crisis lies in the 
uncertain creative temporalities of what 
will ensue from this complex visual sign 
unfolding on the screen. As understood 
by Deleuze, it is not the action depicted 
that is relevant but the rendering 
perceptible of the quality and intensity 
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of the creative temporalities that emerge 
from the depiction of activity. What is 
depicted is ‗a life‘ lived at its emptiest, 
at its most mechanical, bereft of all 
creativity except for the passive 
gestation of crisis and the acquiescent, 
impotent acceptance of whatever will 
come will come, whatever will be, will 
be. And in this scenario of exhaustion, 
within the boredom and ennui of a 
depleted quotidian, we are witness to 
the annunciation of crisis. What comes 
to be seen in the affective residual of the 
fatigue and the mechanical gestures of 
the young woman‘s prepartum 
indolence are the symptoms of 
depletion and the likely fulfilment of 
delivering on the promise of still-born 
exhaustion of any creative potential. 
The obvious function of this 
scene is to activate our expectations and 
predispose us towards a seemingly 
foregone conclusion which will at first 
seem inevitable but which the film‘s 
unfolding will fight all the way. At its 
most basic, the scene taps into our 
memorial circuits of understanding and 
sets us off on a particular trail of 
interpretation of the images based on 
our archive of experiential 
comprehension. We could even say that 
De Sica is visually trolling the viewer, 
for what possible interest could there be 
in this protracted depiction of the 
banality of the early morning program 
of an Italian domestic? Other than 
underscore what Deleuze calls the 
transition from the movement-image to 
the time-image, the tediousness of the 
scene helps to build up in the viewer 
whatever dramatic suspense there may 
be within the ennui of a depleted 
quotidian. Through the woman‘s 
activities and gestures, we see that her 
existence is the symptomatic outcome 
of protracted crisis. Though she is not 
crisis itself, we understand her as a 
conceptual persona of crisis, as the 
personification of the symptoms of 
crisis of the end of history. And in 
opening up the scene so as to overtly 
belabour the routine in the servant‘s 
everyday, De Sica accomplishes 
something else—we get to see what is 
actually going on in the maid‘s here-
and-now as a construction of space-
time. By slowing things down, we 
actually get to see what is happening: 
De Sica brings out the tension between 
the insignificant meaninglessness of the 
maid‘s present and its likely future 
historical replication. The film‘s 
narrative deconstruction of the 
quotidian becomes a mise-en-scene of 
the mise-en-crise brought on by the 
plague of WW II and the ensuing 
ruination which serves as the backdrop 
to this insouciant woman‘s situation—it 
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is De Sica‘s filmic plane of immanence. 
Yet, even if time seems to come to a 
standstill and appears to be devoid of 
the momentum and potential to propel it 
forward, the barrenness of time is 
overcome by the pregnant portent of the 
woman‘s belly as a built-in ―…and 
then?‖, a ―…what now?‖ or even a 
―…so what?‖. It‘s an itchy-scratchy 
problematisation implicit in the positing 
of the need for a decision to be made, of 
a completive resolution to the 
interrogative proposition. The scene 
activates moribund forces that are 
present in the evident finality of a 
disdainfully dismissive retort such as 
―Whatever…‖. But there is no getting 
away from the inevitable resolution of 
the intuitive advance of process because 
time marches on with or without us. 
Because we live and breathe in the 
world and not in a vacuum, there is 
difference built-in within the repetition 
of naked repetitiousness. It might only 
be the differential of potential in two 
instances of the ―same thing‖ separated 
by an infinitesimal interval of time 
which responds to advance with ―what 
next?‖ but the difference making 
potential is there. What de Sica portrays 
is how ―the most banal or everyday 
situations release accumulated 'dead 
forces' equal to the life force of a limit-
situation‖ (Deleuze, 1985/1989, p.3). 
The ineluctable answer to ―ok, what 
next?‖ is the subjective difference 
which cannot be deferred. 
* * * 
The concept of Crisis has 
forever been about the deciding of 
outcome at the turning point, as the 
moment of discernment involved in 
judgement under duress. The ancient 
Greeks articulated the concept as a 
circumstance of movement in both 
physical and mental terms. According to 
Liddell and Scott (1883), krisis involved 
separating and distinguishing within 
decisions or judgements, a trial of skill 
or strength, and the turning point of a 
disease towards its resolution. The 
etymology of the word as per Harper 
(2016) derives from krinein ―to 
separate, decide, judge‖ from the Proto-
Indo-European root *krei- ―to sieve, 
discriminate, distinguish‖ (source also 
of Greek krinesthai ―to explain‖)‖ 
which is the root of both crisis, critique 
and criterion (Walter & Pinho, 2016; 
Assad, Brown and Butler, 2013; Shrag, 
1992; among others). The English 
etymology, as set forth in the O.E.D., 
demonstrates that the non-medical sense 
of crisis came into usage in 1627 in 
reference to a ―Chrysis of Parliaments‖ 
and expanded its meaning to express 
crisis as destructive event such as in 
―the Chrisis of the English tongue‖ 
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(1661), the ―Great Crisises in Church 
and State‖ (1715) and ―to escape a crisis 
so full of terror an despair‖ (1769). By 
their definition, a crisis is a vitally 
important or decisive stage in a process; 
it is a turning point in the state of affairs 
in which a decisive change for better or 
worse is imminent. 
The common thread to the 
evolution of the non-medical sense of 
crisis lies in the production of distress, 
affliction or suffering arising from some 
adverse event affecting a sphere of 
activity. This state of crisis as a 
calamitous event befalling government 
or markets and commerce makes us 
equate being in the world with a state of 
emergency where the destabilising 
effects of crisis indiscriminately cause 
untold hardship and suffering both 
locally and globally. Because of the 
displacements, adjustments and 
accommodations required to respond to 
crises and which, more often than not, 
result in loss and diminution, Virilio 
(2006) characterises crisis as 
criminogenic. Bollnow (1996) points 
out that crises are often understood as 
having arisen from mistakes or neglect 
which should have been foreseen or 
avoided through greater attentiveness 
and more insightful planning—a state of 
affairs exuberantly and dutifully 
reported by the shrill wailing of 
mediatic sirens.  
Whether natural or artificial, a 
crisis is an event which disrupts an on-
going process and requires corrective 
action in order for the process to return 
to its original operation. In self-
regulating ―natural‖ systems such as 
ecological processes or biogeochemical 
cycles, crises are a normal part of the 
system as the dynamic creation of 
unbalance within the process which 
seeks the effectuation of a regulative 
function. Whether brought on by natural 
causes or by artificial disruptions, crises 
are assessed in terms of their human 
impact and disruptive power: ultimately 
they test governability and 
management. Historically considered 
sporadic, crises have become so 
frequent that they are now considered a 
normal aspect of the complex 
dysfunctionality at the interaction of 
social, political, economic and financial 
processes. But what is inescapable is 
that the present is besieged by crisis: 
social, economic, financial, political, 
educational, employment, sexual, 
agricultural, spiritual, ecological, 
energy, sustainability, fisheries, 
housing, military, migrant, health, 
infrastructure, global warming, water 
rights, oil, banking, credit, 
governability, identitary, social security, 
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public security, institutions, policing, 
etc. And no matter who we are or how 
we choose to define ourselves—
conservative or liberal, God-fearing or 
atheist, single or married, black or 
white, male or female, gay or straight, 
or anywhere in between and beyond, 
crisis spares no one—our historical 
existence in the world is plagued by 
crisis.  
The ubiquitousness of crisis was 
not lost on Walter Benjamin, who saw it 
as part of the human condition: ―The 
desperately clear consciousness of being 
in the middle of a crisis is something 
chronic in humanity‖ (Benjamin, 1999, 
p. 545). For him, crisis was varied in its 
articulation as the different aspects of 
one and the very same kaleidoscope 
called historical process. Marxist 
thought understands crises as inevitable, 
unique events which indicate the 
turning points of peaks and troughs in 
the cyclical process of "chaotic" 
capitalist development (Baubion, 2013; 
Pfor & Hosie, 2009). There is an 
implied necessitarianism in this 
understanding of crisis, both, in terms of 
an implicit determinism of the 
inevitability of crises in the unfolding of 
history and in terms of the essential 
mechanism of the dynamics of 
capitalism which considers crises as 
indispensable for enabling the creative 
destruction that gives capitalism its life 
force: the chaos that results from crisis 
and the subsequent period of adjustment 
are seen as production of opportunity 
and creation of value. 
Through the acceleration of 
historical processes, capitalism has 
become increasingly integrated in its 
modes of production and the 
instruments and subjects of labor 
(Virilio, 2006). Thus, the dromological 
conjunction of the horizontal expansion 
and the temporal integration of process 
is producing serialised procession of 
crises which are more intense, more 
frequent (Montani, 2016; Dawson, 
2011), and more encompassing in 
extension so that the spatial separation 
and the temporal interval between zones 
of crisis and non-crisis becomes 
negligible. We now have states of 
permanent crisis (both in terms of 
spatial extension and of temporal 
expression) which become not only 
durative but durational and intensive: 
the historical appearance of punctual 
crises separated by intervals of stability 
has been replaced by a different 
conception of process as the chronic 
spatialised multiplicity of concretised 
crises of shifty intensive meta-
stabilities. The production of crises can 
now no longer be considered a linear 
serialisation of punctual events but a 
Rebolledo-Palazuelos, F. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Rev. Polis e Psique, 2017; 7(1): 227 – 246                                                                                          | 233 
chaotic disposition of ―the 
simultaneous, of juxtaposition, of the 
near and the far, of the side-by-side, of 
the scattered‖ (Foucault, 1998). Crises 
in various arenas of activity overlap 
spatially and temporally, and a 
conjunctive simultaneity of these minor 
crises can produce a major incident that 
affects many sectors and swaths of the 
population simultaneously as an integral 
accident or catastrophe (Virilio, 2006). 
Over the past decades, a change 
has taken place in the occurrence of 
crises from unique events which just 
―happen‖, which are accidental and 
even catastrophic (Virilio, 2006), and 
whose effects are mitigated, controlled 
or rectified to become manufactured 
events instigated by the manipulation of 
social, political, and legal conditions 
towards the precipitation or catalysis of 
crisis. Now, if by definition, the chaos 
arising from crisis is productive of 
disruptions, dissolutions, fragmentations 
or new alliances which unleash 
opportunities for inventive creation and 
production of value, then the 
disturbances arising from the artificial 
mise-en-crise of ―man-made‖ crises can 
be understood to be productive. By 
picking up the pieces from the artificial 
siting or inducement of crisis within 
process and re-assembling them, these 
newly aggregated fragments can be re-
arranged innovatively to invent new 
processual machines. These can be 
harnessed to cobble new assemblages or 
devise novel human and non-human 
technologies as expressions of the 
possibility of making sense and 
fabricating coherence as the realignment 
of value creation. The cyclic process of 
crisis thus proceeds from a phase of 
apparent stability, to a dissolution of 
that stability, a phase of chaotic 
instability, and a consequent novel 
composition along novel alinements 
which in turn become predictable and 
habitual. The crisis is transformative in 
that the initial meta-stable phase is 
transformed through crisis into a 
completely new assemblage where the 
new order has no use for the past except 
as provider of fragments as raw material 
towards novelty and innovation. 
* * * 
In human terms, crises are 
make-or-break events which test bodies 
and compel them to truly make battle 
with life at a survival level. They oblige 
these corporeal entities to break away 
from the (complacency of) comfort, the 
(deadening) routine of habit or from a 
seemingly untenable situation—a 
statement which applies equally well to 
the social one and to the individual 
many. Through crisis, the integrity, 
solidarity and coherence of assemblages 
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is assessed through an assault on the 
fundamentals of existence as a test or 
trial. For Simondon, ―in the being put to 
the test, a law of all or nothing 
manifests itself‖ (Simondon 1958, p.91) 
so that the limit condition of the test as 
singular event is where life is 
experienced at its fullest and acquires its 
maximum realisation. The test engages 
being at all levels and forces bodies to 
use all of their capacities to the limit so 
as to assess resourcefulness under 
extreme duress. This full engagement in 
the resolution of the assault is explained 
in Simondon (1958) though his 
understanding of the test and the 
transformative implications of the 
passage from nonage into adulthood 
which can be traced back to Kant and 
his Aufklarung article of 1755. 
This attitude towards crisis as 
the Big Critical Event disparages the 
humdrum quotidian as deadening, too 
routine and customary, and too run-of-
the-mill to be of interest. Bollnow 
considers the everyday as an 
―inauthentic condition‖ (Bollnow, 1996, 
p. 5) which needs spicing up by regular 
crises to keep things interesting, or to 
maintain life at a ―critical level‖. 
Echoing Nietzsche, Bollnow indicates 
that ―The human being actualizes his 
authentic existence only in the crisis and 
only through the crisis. The critical 
moments are the only moments which 
really count in human life. To exist 
means to stand in crisis‖ (Bollnow, 
1996, p. 5). In line with historical 
materialism, ―crises are not something 
accidental at all; that on the contrary 
align human life according to its 
essential nature and in every moment 
lies in crisis and can only be conceived 
through crisis‖ (Bollnow, 1996, p. 4). 
Rather than being a surface effect—a 
glitch on the surface of advance of the 
unfolding of history—crisis would be 
integral to life and imparts being with 
vitality even if it is experience 
intransitively by ―standing in crisis‖ or 
―lying in crisis‖ or ―wallowing in 
crisis‖. So even if crises are commonly 
portrayed as experienced passively, they 
are suffered actively: populations are 
―fallen prey to the world‖ in that they 
require adjustments and 
accommodations which produce 
hardships affecting the bottom line of 
survivability of their constituents. Crisis 
assaults the operative coherence of 
abstract machinic assemblages of 
bodies, of forces, of language, of 
actions and gestures, of materialities 
and virtualities which compose those 
associated milieus to which we become 
accustomed and which provide 
continuity and repetition, a semblance 
of stability and the comfort of habit. 
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Thus, crisis is felt as a tangible threat, as 
physical and mental abuse, as violence 
carried out on bodies. 
Given its pervasiveness and 
pernicious effects, perhaps crisis could 
once again be considered a medical 
condition. When Ortega y Gasset 
characterises in Toward a Philosophy of 
History (1941) the moral crisis which 
overwhelms society as the sickness of 
our age he was applying the idea to a 
body-social to what was already 
understood as an illness of the body in 
Antiquity by Hippocrates and Galen. 
Now, given our evolved understanding 
of the nature of diseases and their 
causality, instead of sickness, perhaps 
we should refer to crisis as a syndrome, 
as the effect of the concurrence of 
various symptoms. The shock of crisis 
suffered by a body-social generates 
trauma (Kalayjian, Donovan & 
Shigemoto, 2010)—a trauma which 
produces wounds and leaves scars as 
traces of the experiential passage of 
crisis as threshold experience and 
reveals itself both materially and 
psychically in terms of the one and 
many. In their analysis of the residual 
effects of Hurricane Andrew which 
devastated Southern Florida, USA in 
1992, Kalayjian, Donovan and 
Shigemoto (2010) find that ―Survivors 
cope with trauma in a myriad of ways. 
Some suffer anxiety, shock, feeling of 
helplessness and hopelessness, intense 
anger, post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), depression and psychosomatic 
illness such as constant headaches and 
nausea‖ (p. 74). Further, citing Park and 
Ai (2006), they assert that survivors feel 
that ―their global meaning, consisting of 
beliefs, goals and subjective feelings 
has been shattered by the trauma‖ (p. 
75). This repeats the findings of 
Cropanzano, Rupp and Byrne (2003), 
who posit that states of crisis in 
individuals have been linked to 
emotional exhaustion characterised by 
―a plethora of ailments, including 
physiological problems, depression, 
family difficulties, and a general 
breakdown in feelings of community‖. 
These ailments were observed after one 
―occurrence‖ of crisis, but when we 
consider the effects of perpetual crisis, 
we can understand the widespread 
feelings of helplessness and exhaustion 
of creative capabilities in failing to 
adapt to the ceaseless offering of change 
as well as the depletion of intellectual, 
emotional, spiritual and physical 
resources to cope with the demands of 
the constant reshuffling of the 
experiential landscape of crisis 
capitalism. So that once we come to see 
these chronic repeating attacks of crisis 
as recurrences of illness pervading the 
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social body, one would want to activate 
clinical faculties and act therapeutically 
without delay, without deferral, to ―cure 
the disease‖ lest its relentless attacks 
kills the socio-political animal outright.  
* * * 
Curiously, the article by 
Kalayjian, Donovan and Shigemoto, is 
prefaced by an inspirational quote by 
Howard Thurman, an African-American 
author, philosopher, and civil rights 
leader, which states ―Ask not what the 
world needs, ask what you need to come 
alive because what the world needs is 
people like you—who have come alive‖ 
(Kalayjian, Donovan & Shigemoto, 
2010, p. 73). We write ‗curiously‘ 
because in the implicit onus towards 
self-reliance and self-dependency 
towards the resolution and the crafting 
of solutions to the problematic effects of 
crisis, we perceive a particular 
understanding of what crisis entails and 
its social dimension. In its appeal to 
―come alive‖, we see a recognition of 
the deadening effects of chronic crisis 
as a challenge to be overcome—not 
through salvation by God, the State, or 
the social organisation of the common, 
but through ourselves as stand-alone 
individuals. Only the individual 
―coming alive‖ leads to a path of social 
action; but if the individual is 
disinclined to take this first step towards 
deciding ―what‘s next?‖ then all is lost. 
In the gaping void of the featureless 
landscape of anomie and ennui of 
chronic crisis, the question which 
critically defines our subjectivity at its 
most fundamental is ―To be or not to 
be?‖. And to simply pose this question 
as the decisive moment of choosing, as 
the most basic expression of our 
subjectivity, is a mise-en-crise of our 
existence. By asking this question, we 
fight fire with fire: we are using the 
creative potential of crisis to overcome 
the overwhelming effects of perpetual 
crisis. Some might frown upon fighting 
fire with fire, and look for water to 
douse the flames, yet we propose to 
conjure crisis differently. We 
problematise the situation by inducing 
crisis and activating the creative 
destruction within process through the 
dissolution of the archive which can be 
seen simultaneously as an ankylosed 
repository of habit, of complacent 
compliance, of self-serving custom, of 
deadening routine and as the landscape 
of physical, intellectual, emotional, 
spiritual landscape of exhaustion and 
depletion?. How does one create 
destructively? How does one put the 
well-trodden path of habit, comfort, 
complacency, self-satisfaction and 
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* * * 
Crisis is usually seen as a 
negative affect in terms of what it does 
to bodies, but within process, crisis is a 
necessary mechanism integral to the 
advancement of processual becoming.  
And even if crisis is a concept 
abstracted from experience, its 
predominant usage as the designation of 
a particular type of macro-event 
adumbrates the exact articulation of its 
specific processual operation as a 
technical term. In its elaboration, we 
move away from its external 
manifestation in the world and attempt 
to identify its workings at a molecular 
scale within, through and by process. 
We wish to liken it to a first gesture 
towards an indeterminate logic of 
experimentation towards the invention 
of new passions, beliefs and desires as 
Gabriel Tarde suggestively proposes 
throughout his work. We seek to give it 
a dynamic which identifies it within 
process alongside André Gide‘s mise-
en-abyme or Husserl‘s epochē or 
Bergson‘s method of intuition. Yet, we 
posit putting in crisis as a non-method 
because it is not a pre-established 
protocol that looks to be repeated or 
copied. As such, it is linked to the 
method of intuition as elaborated by 
Bergson and Deleuze in that the 
methods are modes of understanding the 
problematisation and resolution of 
becoming. They both describe passage 
yet articulate it differently both in terms 
of causality and processual 
advancement. As such, they are both 
liminal moments but approach the 
threshold differently, traverse it 
differently, and offer up their results 
differently. Crisis and intuition both 
present conjunctions of circumstances, 
of occasions, which afford the 
opportunity of becoming as event. They 
are both auspicious moments in which a 
multiplicity of conditions are ripe, 
charged, pregnant with the possibility of 
an emergence which when offered the 
right opportunity, the odds are that 
potentials will be activated and 
actualised and movement will happen. 
Both can be seen as a turning-point, an 
inflection which deviates the relation so 
that flux diverges towards novelty and 
innovation; here, the deviation is a 
veering away of the clinamen—the 
taking-off of the line of flight. This 
divergence is a moment of truth in that 
it passes the test to the smallest detail of 
the commitment of the advance into 
novelty—the outcome of which is not 
the intuition or the crisis. The result is 
the payoff of movement but it is not 
movement itself. And the criteria of 
truth in the happening itself is not a true 
or false test of logic but the coherent 
Rebolledo-Palazuelos, F. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
Rev. Polis e Psique, 2017; 7(1): 227 – 246                                                                                          | 238 
operativity of the movement. The 
moment of passage for both is in the 
motive conditions of action as the 
making time of difference in the time of 
its making—it is the feeling of the 
creative differencing as affective 
outcome and as ―the basic generic 
operation of passing from the 
objectivity of the data to the subjectivity 
of the actual entity in question‖ 
(Whitehead, 1929/1978, p. 41). Thus, 
both occupy the moment of passage as 
the transiting of the interval between the 
what comes before and the what comes 
after. The alinements of becoming 
appear at different stages of processual 
advancement for intuition and for crisis. 
For intuition, alinements of causal 
conditionings become increasingly 
acute until an ineluctable conversion 
occurs. For crisis, alinements for 
developmental conditionings result 
from the aggregative outcomes of 
association. Thus, intuition can be 
characterised as a fashioning of 
alinements, whereas crisis distinguishes 
itself as alinements which lead to 
perceptual aggregation.  
In Bergsonism (1966/1988), 
Deleuze reformulates the method of 
intuition as gleaned from Bergson to re-
conceptualise intuition. The way he 
does this is by a progressive application 
of discursive carving away or reduction 
of possibilities to determine what is 
ultimately operative as a guiding 
principle through the tangle of pathways 
of choice. Deleuze cleverly determines 
what is fundamentally productive in 
intuition through an appraisal of 
Bergson‘s ideas by following the same 
‗intuitive‘ method which Bergson 
himself uses to analyse what is 
essentially operative. Deleuze, like 
Bergson before him, uses the method he 
is prescribing to do what he is 
prescribing. The three rules of the 
method stipulated by Bergson consist of 
appropriate problematisation, 
differentiating, and temporalizing: this 
entails (1) a critique of false problems 
and the invention of genuine ones; (2) 
narrowing and convergence; and (3) 
thinking in terms of duration. This is not 
a step-by-step protocol towards the 
correct use of intuition as method but an 
offering of strategies or possible 
approaches towards the positing of a 
precise and unambiguous problem 
through the almost instantaneous 
formulation of its exacting and fitting 
solution. 
The method of intuition gets 
underway with the casting of what can 
only be considered as a tentative 
position-question as a problem seeking 
answers. But not just not any kind of 
problem, a proposition in which 
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something is to be done, posited as a 
becoming-doing, as extensive 
occupation which problematises both 
time and space. It is the answer to the 
simple question ―how to act now?‖ To 
know how to answer this question 
decisively, without prevarication, 
without doubt, to know the why in the 
how of the present is the exercise of 
subjective freedom as the expression of 
intuition. This is not a formulation of 
the problem by attempting to contain it, 
by rendering it determinable by 
categorically delimiting it from the 
outside but of working with it to render 
the problem productive of truth within 
and without—the truth is in the 
productivity of the operational 
coherence of the problem as a 
restatement of its premises, conditions, 
situation, implications, through to its 
possible outcomes and a decisive, 
inevitable, ineluctable solution. 
Complexification is not a rendering of 
the problem more complicated but of 
unravelling the knotty implications at 
an impasse of ideas through the 
progressive refinement of the statement 
of the problem and the advancement of 
partial solutions. We find ourselves 
with the solution we deserve to the 
problem we have been able to pose, yet, 
if we don‘t like that solution we can 
always continue to cast until we land a 
solution we like better to a different 
aspect of the problem. 
In contrast, our non-method of 
crisis begins by dissolving the 
archive—the ‗monumental‘ repository 
of memorial knowledge and disciplined 
discursive practices—into a chaos of 
poessive potential. By dissolving the 
archive, we create an anarchive—a 
primeval soup of elemental virtuality, a 
reservoir of free-flowing creative 
potential that entertains no discipline 
and admits no ruling power. The 
anarchive itself is not an objective 
creation, it is pure deterritorialisation; it 
is a chaotic, pre-individual multiplicity 
that enables creative difference to 
flourish and offer compositional 
opportunity through various modes of 
engaging, of relating, of 
experimentation, of moving, of 
associating, of analysis and critique. 
The anarchive is the premise of 
occupation of space and time both as 
vocational doing and as milieu which 
produces consistencies from the 
pursuance of creative trajectories which 
transcend horizons and lead to wayward 
territorializations—these activity-filled 
landscapes of creation are emergent 
landing sites for lines of flight as 
becoming-fields of possibility. 
Anarchives can literally be physical 
locales—but these usually only serve as 
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background activity, scenic backcloths, 
reticular surfaces, as canvases or 
screens to the saliency of movements of 
thought, of sense and of sensation. The 
architectural spaces are conditioning 
backgrounds to the durational 
intoxications of affective intensities, of 
alchemical topologies of transmutation, 
of expansive authoring of fabulation, of 
mystical temporalities of contemplation, 
of symphonic creative attunements, of 
empathic communication, or of the 
common space of the excluded middle 
of educational complicity. These 
repositories of chaos are anarchic 
situations of choice which have no 
―rhyme or reason‖—they are non-
paradigmatic in their unfettered 
availability of movement, of association 
and freedom of choice in the deciding 
―what to do next?‖ They are milieus 
which demand and produce pure 
creation and which as the archē of 
chaotic, autarkic, anarchic potential can 
only be labelled anarchival. 
These explorations encourage us 
to tap into usually inaccessible and 
long-forgotten resources and invite us to 
contemplations of new becomings, of 
inventiveness, of composing with 
unknown potentials to produce affects, 
concepts, percepts which lure our 
becomings along different alinements 
away from the habit of routine 
organisation and structuration. The 
impossible task we set before us 
consists of dissolving the memorial past 
inherent in knowledges and practices 
which precondition experience in our 
emergent cartographies not to end up 
with an empty shell of unfulfilled 
potential, but to end up with an archē 
full of actual possibility. The 
featurelessness of the chaotic anarchive 
is not ―no thing‖, it is an oversaturated 
fullness of potential looking for a 
problem to exorcise the possibilities 
within. And what is scary in that 
fullness of featureless chaos is that there 
is nothing there to help one decide as to 
how to advance, how to proceed, how to 
answer ―what next?‖ By dissolving the 
archive and erasing the memory banks, 
there is no valid method, no trodden 
path to lead us forth, no trail of 
breadcrumbs to help us return to an 
origin which can reorient us. Once the 
archive is dissolved, we are in the 
origin-less midst of an uncharted, 
feature-less any-place-whatever. The 
anarchive thus becomes the site of pure 
becoming of creation and invention. 
In these anarchives of research-
creation, the enterprise within the soupy 
milieu of pure potential is stirred up, 
whisked and enfolded into itself so that 
fragments begin to lump, to chunk, to 
coalesce and compose together into 
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larger fragments which in turn 
aggregate to create clusters of 
composite intensifications. When sorted 
out through the screening process of the 
Greek verb ―krino‖—which was 
mentioned earlier as derived from the 
Proto-Indo-European root *krei- "to 
sieve, discriminate, distinguish‖, these 
assemblages resolve themselves from 
the background screen to create objects 
―which do not pass‖ (Whitehead 
1920/2004, p. 143), which compose 
enduring corpuscular societies 
(Whitehead, 1929/1978, p. 99) and 
corporeal assemblages as zones of 
opaque intensities and contrasts—
physical and non-physical material 
images amassing on a plane of 
immanence. As fanciful as this 
depiction appears to be, it is a 
paraphrase of section 53a of Plato‘s 
Timaeus (Archer-Hind 1888, p. 187) 
which does not mention krisis or krinein 
per se but involves the subjective 
discriminating actions and gestures of 
sorting through sifting, sieving and 
winnowing as well as aggregation of 
elemental materials. This activity 
constitutes two aspects of the 
experiential conception of the creative 
composition brought on by shaking, 
agitating and winnowing, i.e. the 
aggregation which exhibits perceptual 
qualities resulting from the shake-down 
of vibration and oscillation and the 
composition of assemblages resulting 
from attunements of ―‗selective 
gravitation‘ where like attracts like‖ 
(Jammer, 1993, p. 15).  
As such, the non-method of 
crisis proceeds from either 
acknowledging a problem to be dealt 
with, or simply from the affirmation of 
the desire to problematise as speculative 
exploration—that there is what-with to 
complexify, slow-down, open up, 
reconfigure, question, vivify, 
anarchivise. It is a matter of affirming 
the dissolution of memory-based, self-
perpetuating, disciplined knowledge-
creation and discursive practices, of 
affirming the immanent emergence of 
innovation and novelty through, with 
and by the experimentation with novelty 
in assemblages, in the alinements of 
practices and relations, in modes of 
organisation and participation, in 
articulating afresh the folds of 
transindividual affinities.  
What emerges from these 
speculative explorations which 
constitute the rhizomatics of research-
creation is the micro-politics of 
expression within ecologies of practices 
which produce minor-knowledge. This 
constitutes a critique—but what kind of 
critique? A critique which emerges 
immanently from the chaos of the 
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anarchive. Thus, the ―eventualisation‖ 
of critique as advocated by Foucault in 
‗What is Critique?‘ seeks to understand 
the manifestation, articulation and 
application of power by restoring ―the 
conditions for the appearance of a 
singularity born out of multiple 
determining elements of which it is not 
the product but the effect‖ (Foucault, 
2005, p. 64). Once we start considering 
the effects of relation and dismissing its 
terms, we end up with determinations of 
affective intensities as a discussion of 
flows of time-pressure in power—which 
as Foucault rightly points out are 
refractory to any kind of solid 
determinacy on account of ―variable 
margins of non-certainty‖ (Foucault, 
2005, p. 64).  
This would be a sustainable 
critical approach arising from an 
ontology of critique which diverges 
from the critical, evaluative and 
judgmental, which presents an 
alternative voice to negative critique, to 
cynicism dressed up as tough-
mindedness (Noys, 2010, p. 71), to 
nihilism and defeatism, to the 
identification of lack and the 
perpetuation of conflict as the mode of 
the unfolding of discourse. It is a 
critique which does not engage the 
pornography of manufactured 
controversy: it is not a process of 
continuous strife and conflict so that 
friction between opposing factions 
results in perpetual dissonance, 
dissension and discord and where the 
new synthesis is neither satisfactory to 
one or the other. It is a mode of critique 
which is based on the philosophy of 
difference, on an ethics of creative 
dissidence, on propositional invention, 
of partnered and shared creation—a 
movement of thought based on 
empathic affective attunements, of 
composing with the advance into 
novelty and difference. Specifically, it 
would be an affirmative, immanent 
critique as a mode of knowing and 
constructing knowledge that articulates 
itself through conceptual and practical 
constructivism, intuition and 
affirmation. As a critical methodology, 
it requires the engagement with the 
thought of others as a working with and 
a working through of constructive 
forces instead of the perpetual de-
construction of abstraction, of working 
contra, the identification of perceived 
deficiencies and the attempt at an 
elusive totalisation as full resolution and 
completeness as perfection—it is the 
creation of an abstract machine that 
enables productive thought and 
commentary and not judgments or 
disciplinary policing, but which is 
rigorous and engaging. As an activity in 
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the world, immanent critique as 
herewith explored has ethical 
implications—principally, the 
subjectivities which emerge within and 
through the affirmative move of 
immanent critique disarms the question 
of desubjectivation in that it exercises 
creative subjectivity through the 
creative composing-with, composing-
through and composing tout-court of its 
discourse as a collective endeavour 
activated individually. 
As Foucault points out in 
―Practicing Criticism‖ (1981), ―A 
critique is not a matter of saying that 
things are not right as they are. It is a 
matter of pointing out on what kinds of 
assumptions, what kinds of familiar, 
unchallenged, unconsidered modes of 
thought the practices that we accept 
rest‖ (1981, p. 154). And this would be 
the first step in putting the quotidian in 
crisis. By indicating those ways of 
being, by identifying those gestures 
which have become easy and second-
nature, those ingrained habits and 
shortcuts which coerce us into believing 
that we are making time for the good 
things by saving time, when in fact we 
are emptying time of its creative 
potential. This voiding of time which 
accelerates unfolding, exhausts and 
depletes us, tires us that much faster, as 
the light that burns twice as intensely 
burns out twice as quickly—it is a 
matter of revivifying time. So our mode 
of critique is an attunement with and a 
recognition of the processual, of the 
becoming of things, of the differential 
offset, of the experiential passage of 
consequence, of experience as ceaseless 
thresholding which becomes the 
foundation of the method. It becomes 
intellectual movement of thought not as 
the abstracted synthesis of experience of 
bodies in the world, but of dismantling 
and deconstructing of experience in 
order to understand that things as 
accepted ―are not as self-evident as one 
believed‖ (Foucault, 1981, p. 155). ―So 
that as soon as one can no longer think 
things as one formerly thought them, 
transformation becomes both very 
urgent, very difficult, and quite 




Treatment for a neo-realist drama for 
neo-liberal times 
 
The maid was forced to move on 
when her daughter was born and the 
landlady married. Night has fallen and 
we see her trudging home from her job 
as a cleaning lady. She is exhausted and 
at wits end. She has worked 9 hours 
today, travelled one hour each way, 
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done more than the windows and done a 
great job of it. She has earned a 
minimum wage and had to pay for her 
transportation to and from work. With 
prices rising on all household items, she 
has not been able to make ends meet; 
her existence is one challenge after 
another, testing her abilities to cope on a 
daily basis. Although she has been 
aware of the mounting difficulties for a 
while, she can no longer postpone the 
resolution of her untenable situation. To 
stay afloat, she would need almost twice 
the minimum wage. Over the past few 
months, she has found herself 
transported from the deadening crisis of 
the ―never had it so good‖ boredom and 
ennui of the depleted quotidian of 
brainless routine and moved to the 
utopia of the self-reliant, free-lance 
entrepreneur and the ―world is your 
oyster of opportunity‖ of perpetual 
crisis and its exhausting ceaseless 
offering of change. Her world is one 
perpetual becoming-crisis, and though 
she cannot formulate it intellectually, 
she is beginning to understand from 
first-hand experience how deadening 
the perpetual challenge of neo-liberal, 
individualistic, ―life-affirming‖, heroic 
subjectivity can be. Her situation is 
unbearable and impacting her 
survivability and that of her daughter—
the resolution to her dilemma has 
become non-deferrable because it has 
come down to answering the question 
―to be or not to be?‖ She can no longer 
accept the status quo of what she had 
believed to be her inevitable destiny. 
Her past has become insufferable and 
her only option now is to put her 
perpetual crisis in crisis. An affective 
rupture is taking place and she begins to 
ask ―how can I make my life 
different?‖, ―what kind of life do I wish 
to invent for myself?‖, ―what kind of 
life do I wish to pursue?‖ She lets go of 
her past and forgets it. Before her she 
can see a boundless landscape of 
singular, collective, libertarian 
movement, experimentation and 
possibility. There is no going back: 
something irreversible has taken 
place—what had been unthinkable 
yesterday, is today becoming-desire. 
And this desiring-machine occupying 
her body, populating her imagination, 
and storming her affective being is a 
new understanding of her situation. An 
understanding which subscribes to a 
logic of life and not to a logic of the 
market. An ethical imperative wells up 
within her that will recast her political 
perceptions as critique immanent in her 
being-doing. She might have to 
continue to work as a cleaning lady but 
today was transformative. Sitting at the 
kitchen table where she is doing her 
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accounts, she looks up and sees a moth 
flying repeatedly circling and striking 
the glass ampule of a bare light bulb 
trying to attain the electric 
incandescence within. The woman 
understands that she is no longer like 
the moth; she has become a firefly 
firing off sporadic luminescence in the 
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